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Abstract
The following sections outline four main phases in the history of European integration. First,
this Article examines the decisive contribution that European integration made in the immediate postwar years to solving the German question and achieving Franco-German rapprochement.
Second, it looks at the steps taken in the mid-1950s to launch the broader European Economic
Community (“EEC”). The next section explains the difficulties encountered in completing the
single market, which were eventually overcome in the late 1980s. The mixed record of the EU,
launched in 1993 following ratification of the Treaty on European Union (”Maastricht Treaty”),
is then examined. The final sections provide a brief assessment of the achievements of European
integration and an overview of the integrative opportunities and individual initiatives that have
characterized the process so far.

FIFTY YEARS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT
Desmond Dinan*
INTRODUCTION
Europe today is more peaceful and prosperous than at any
time in history. Not coincidentally, it is also densely integrated
politically and economically. The process of voluntary, highly institutionalized integration, epitomized by the European Union
("EU"), has generated intense transnational activity and
changed the political and economic landscape in Europe. Without doubt, the EU and the process of integration for which it
stands are the foundations of the exceptional openness of contemporary Europe, in stark contrast to the insecurity generally
prevailing before 1945.
European integration has created a new level of governance
with an elaborate and innovative institutional design. It no
longer seems remarkable that heads of state or government of
twenty-seven countries meet at least four times a year under the
auspices of the European Council, the EU's most important decision-making body. The European Council was launched only
in 1975, at a time when economic integration was fraying in the
face of a global economic downturn and persistent stagflation.
Regular summit meetings helped to focus national leaders' attention on the perniciousness of Euro-sclerosis and provided an
indispensable forum at the highest political level for decisions in
the mid-1980s to revive European integration. Before 1975, let
alone before 1945, summit meetings of European leaders were
rare and often fraught occasions. Now they are commonplace
and are integral to the functioning of Europe as we know it.
The European Council is the tip of the EU institutional iceberg. Also visible above the surface is the Council of Ministers,
whose regular meetings bring together in various configurations
most government ministers from the Member States; the Commission, the EU's executive body, composed largely of senior
politicians nominated by the Member States and approved by
* Desmond Dinan is Professor of Public Policy and holds the Jean Monnet Chair at
the School of Public Policy, George Mason University.
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the European Parliament; and the European Parliament itself,
whose members are directly elected across the EU every five
years. Less well known but by no means less important, is the
European Court of Justice. Together, these legislative, executive, and judicial bodies make up the governing structure of the
EU. Beneath them, and forming the mass of the EU iceberg, are
thousands of European civil servants-the cogs in the EU's institutional machinery.
The European level of governance, a novelty of the postWorld War II period, does not exist in isolation but is deeply
embedded in the national and sub-national levels. Government
ministers embody the interconnectedness of these three levels;
Commissioners act partly as transition belts between the EU and
the countries from which they come; and the system of preliminary rulings links national judiciaries and the EU judiciary.
Hundreds of expert committees and working groups, whose
meetings dominate the EU calendar, bring together Commission and national officials. Plenary sessions and committee
meetings of the European Parliament are opportunities for national and EU-level politicians and officials to interact with Europarliamentarians. National parliaments, hitherto marginalized
by the deepening of European integration, will have new opportunities to participate in EU governance, thanks to important
provisions in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007.1 Representatives of subnational governments meet in the Committee of the Regions,
while representatives of the "social partners" (workers' and employers' organizations) meet in the Economic and Social Committee-two EU advisory bodies. A dense network of lawyers,
lobbyists, consultants, experts, and academics buttresses the official apparatus of European integration.
While small compared to national governments, EU government is nonetheless impressive by virtue of its existence-it is
the only system of supranational governance anywhere in the
world-and of its effectiveness. The policy reach of the EU has
grown dramatically since the early days of European integration,
thanks to changing political and economic circumstances, "spillover" (the fact that action in one policy area often necessitates
involvement as well in related policy areas), a growing range of
1. Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty), O.J. C 306/01 (2007), signed Dec. 13, 2007
(not yet ratified).
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national interests in an ever-enlarging EU, and policy entrepreneurship on the part of integration-minded politicians and officials. As a result, few areas of public policy lack a Brussels dimension.
Nevertheless, the EU's "competence" or power to regulate
varies greatly across policy areas. Defining the nature and extent
of EU involvement in a vast range of policies has preoccupied
European leaders for some time, not least in the latest round of
treaty reform. The Treaty of Lisbon, like the ill-fated Draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe2 ("Constitutional
Treaty") from which it emerged, provides some clarity by identifying three categories of EU competence-exclusive; shared;
and supporting, coordinating or complementary-and listing
the policies covered by each one. Such a clarification sought to
correct the misapprehension that competences were creeping
inexorably upward to the EU level, and to help apply the principle of "subsidiarity" (the idea that decisions should be taken at
the lowest appropriate level).
The single currency is surely the most prominent example
of EU policy competence. Indeed, monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the EU, although only fifteen of the EU's
twenty-seven member states have so far adopted the euro. Yet
the EU's core competence, its raison d'etre, is undoubtedly the
single market, which enables goods, services, capital, and people
to move freely among Member States. Although by no means
fully implemented or functioning perfectly, the single market is
an astonishing achievement that is woefully underappreciated by
most Europeans.
To put the single market in perspective, consider the extent
of economic integration in North America, first within the
United States, then between the United States and Canada. As
one would expect in a full-fledged federation, state boundaries
are largely irrelevant to economic transactions in the United
States. Even with the single market, the EU is far less integrated
economically than the United States. Yet it is far more integrated than the United States and Canada, which despite their
cultural and economic similarities and their membership in the
North American Free Trade Area, are separated by a border that
2. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, O.J. C 310/1 (2004) (not rati-

fied) [hereinafter Constitutional Treaty].
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greatly impedes economic activity and the movement of people.
The U.S.-Canada border has become more of an obstacle to international commerce in the aftermath of the September 2001

terrorist attacks in the United States, as American lawmakers impose additional security checks at points of entry into the country. Paradoxically in an age of rapid globalization, the impediments to economic exchange between two of the most developed economies in the world, neighbors and friends in the
North American continent, are rising, not falling.
Compared to crossing the United States-Canada border,
crossing the border between two EU Member States is effortless.
Even entering those EU countries outside the so-called
Schengen free-travel area, in which people move across borders
without having to stop for immigration inspection, is relatively
easy. Beyond the free movement of people, however, the most
impressive distinction between the EU and North America is the
existence in Europe of the single market, made possible by detailed rules and regulations on the removal of technical, fiscal,
and physical barriers to trade. The politically unglamorous but
economically indispensable goal of a single market was enshrined in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 1957 ("Treaty of Rome"), the founding document of
the European Economic Community ("EEC").' Yet it was only
in the late 1980s that European leaders launched a program to
revitalize economic integration and finally achieved the long-declared goal of the single market. The history of European integration in the thirty-five years after the launch of the EEC is really the history of the failure, in the 1970s and 1980s, and ultimate success, in the early 1990s, of constructing the single
market.
The following sections outline four main phases in the history of European integration. 4 First, this Article examines the
decisive contribution that European integration made in the immediate postwar years to solving the German question and
achieving Franco-German rapprochement. Second, it looks at
3. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
4. For a general history of European integration, see DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION (2004); MARK GILBERT, SURPASSING REALISM: THE
POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 1945 (2003); JOHN GILLINGHAM, EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION,

1950-2003:

SUPERSTATE OR NEW MARKET ECONOMY?

(2003).
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the steps taken in the mid-1950s to launch the broader EEC.
The next section explains the difficulties encountered in completing the single market, which were eventually overcome in
the late 1980s. The mixed record of the EU, launched in 1993
following ratification of the Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty"),5 is then examined. The final sections provide a
brief assessment of the achievements of European integration
and an overview of the integrative opportunities and individual
initiatives that have characterized the process so far.
I. SOLVING THE GERMAN PROBLEM
The lessons of the failed post-World War I settlement were
on policy-makers' minds at the end of World War II. This time
Germany was utterly defeated and everywhere occupied by the
victorious powers. How could Germany be rehabilitated and
tied into a postwar system that would ensure peace and prosperity for all concerned? For the Western allies, embedded liberalism 6-based on the Bretton Wood's institutions-provided the
international foundations of such a system.
The Soviet Union prevented its soon-to-be satellite states
from participating in the Marshall Plan, the U.S. initiative to
consolidate economic reconstruction in Europe and bind the
postwar American and European economies closer together. As
the Cold War intensified, the Soviet Union and the Central and
Eastern European countries under its control set themselves
apart from the emerging transatlantic economic system in an
autarkic, centrally-planned economic area. As Europe split, so
did Germany. For the West, the "German problem" meant consolidating democracy in the new Federal Republic (the former
Western zones of occupation), while managing its economic recovery in a way that allayed the economic and strategic concerns
of other Western European states.7
The German problem became acute as the pace of economic recovery in the Western zones of occupation intensified.
5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 191 (1992)
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
6. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INr'L ORG. 379, 382-83 (1982).
7. See MICHAEL HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1947-1952 (1987)

shall Plan and its impact on postwar Europe).

(providing an account of the Mar-
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The United States wanted to accelerate German recovery in order to reduce its military occupation costs and hasten economic
growth throughout the transatlantic area. A weak West Germany, the Americans argued, meant a weak Western Europe.
That was part of the rationale behind the Marshall Plan. France
understood America's point, but wanted to modernize its own
industry, largely through unfettered access to coking coal in Germany's Ruhr valley, before allowing Germany's economy to rebound. Indeed, France agreed to establish the Federal Republic only on condition that German coal production, a key ingredient of industrial development, remained under allied control.
Not least because of the deepening Cold War, the United
States intensified pressure on France to relax its policy toward
Germany. Yet the United States was not insensitive to French
security fears. Rather than impose a solution, Washington
pressed Paris to devise a policy that would facilitate French industrial modernization while at the same time permitting Germany's full recovery. Under mounting American pressure,
France came up with a way to satisfy seemingly irreconcilable
French and German economic interests by establishing a supranational organization to manage the two countries' coal and
steel resources. The proposed Coal and Steel Community would
protect French interests by providing continued access to German resources, on the basis of cooperation rather than coercion." For the new government in Bonn, it provided a means of
resolving the contentious Ruhr problem and rehabilitating Germany internationally.
The initiative that led to the Coal and Steel Community was
a major reversal of French foreign policy. Having tried to keep
Germany down since the war, France instead sought to turn the
apparent unavoidability of Germany's economic recovery to its
advantage by establishing a common market in coal and steel.
The French plan reconciled national, European, and transatlantic interests. Couched in the language of reconciliation, it represented a dramatic new departure in European as well as in
French and German affairs.9
8. See generally Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr.
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
9. See JOHN GILLINGHAM, COAL, STEEL, AND THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE, 1945-1955:
THE GERMANS AND FRENCH FROM RUHR CONFLICT TO ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 228-98
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Participation in the plan was supposedly open to all the
countries of Europe. Inevitably, the Cold War excluded Central
and Eastern European countries from participation. In Western
Europe, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries
were wary of supranational initiatives and unwilling to join the
proposed community. Spain and Portugal, under dictatorial regimes, were international outcasts; and Switzerland was resolutely neutral. That left the Benelux countries (Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg), which were economically tied
to France and Germany, and Italy, which saw integration primarily as a means of combating domestic communism and restoring international legitimacy. Consequently the Coal and Steel
Community, launched in 1952, had only six Member States.
The importance of the Coal and Steel Community was more
political than economic.'" Although it soon established a common market in coal and steel products, with generous provisions
for workers' rights, the new community did not have a marked
impact on postwar Europe's economic development, which was
spectacular in any case. Politically, the Coal and Steel Community symbolized the willingness of France and Germany to cooperate closely so soon after the end of the war and institutionalized, through the machinery of supranational governance, an
enduring Franco-German rapprochement that soon made the
prospect of war between two erstwhile enemies not just unlikely
but simply outlandish.
II. FROM COAL AND STEEL TO THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Political scientists who studied European integration in the
heady days of the Coal and Steel Community posited a knock-on
or spillover effect." According to these neo-functionalists, as
manufacturers and interest groups cooperated with each other
across national boundaries and interacted intensively with the
(1991);

ALAN S. MILWARD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE,

1945-51,

at

467-

72 (1984).
10. For a history of the functioning of the new community, see DIRK SPIERENBURG

& RAYMOND

POIDEVIN, THE HISTORY OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL

SUPRANATIONALITY IN OPERATION (1994).
11. Foremost amongst these political scientists was Ernst Haas. See ERNST B. HAAS,

AND STEEL COMMUNITY.

THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLTICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES

317 (1958).

1950-1957,

at

291-
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Community's supranational institutions, notably the High Authority (the forerunner of the European Commission), pressure
would build for national governments to transfer responsibility
for related policy areas and expand the scope of European governance. The launch in 1958 of the European Economic Community ("EEC"), which aimed to establish a common market for
all industrial goods and facilitate the free movement as well of
capital, services and (eventually) people,1 2 seemed to vindicate
the neo-functionalists. Yet the historical record suggests that
rather than flowing ineluctably from the Coal and Steel Community, the EEC originated in a set of circumstances quite different
from those prevailing earlier in the decade.1 3
In particular, the German problem was no longer pressing.
A projected European Defense Community, along the lines of
the Coal and Steel Community, had collapsed in 1954, leaving a
residue of ill-will in German governing circles toward France,
which had first proposed the military initiative and then rejected
it amid acrimonious domestic debate.14 Yet most Germans
seemed indifferent to the demise of the Defense Community,
and Franco-German economic cooperation continued unabated. The launch of the EEC so soon after the collapse of the
Defense Community demonstrated the continuing relevance of
European integration, but primarily for reasons having to do
with international trade.
Thanks largely to liberalization measures in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation ("OEEC") and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), intra-European trade and prosperity rapidly increased. 1 5 European governments sought more cross-border trade, but disagreed on the
pace and range of liberalization. The British favored further
tariff cuts through the OEEC and the GATT, as did the influen12. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15.
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it.
Id.
13. See, e.g., ALAN MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE 7 (2000).

14. See GILLINGHAM, supra note 9, at 349, 352.
15. See MILWARD, supra note 9, at 122.
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tial economics ministry in Germany. The French were instinctively protectionist, although some prominent politicians advocated openness. The Dutch, with a small and open economy,
wanted full liberalization and were impatient with progress in
the OEEC and the GATT, where the need for unanimity constrained decision-making.1 6
Accordingly, the Dutch revived an earlier proposal for a
common market covering all industrial sectors. This would combine a customs union-the phased abolition of tariffs between
Member States and erection of a common external tariff-with
the eventual abolition of all impediments to intra-Community
trade, subject to supranational decision-making in a wide range
of policy areas. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer overcame
resistance within his government to deeper regional integration
by citing the importance of working closely with France and embedding the Federal Republic in European institutions. In
France itself, advocates of the EEC prevailed over their ultra-protectionist compatriots by getting the other prospective Member
States to agree to include provisions in the Rome Treaty for a
common agricultural policy and preferential trade arrangements
for existing and former French colonies.
The Rome Treaty was a hard-fought political compromise.
Its provisions ranged from the general to the specific, from the
mundane to the arcane. Those on the phased introduction of
the customs union, by 1970 at the latest, were the most concrete.
Institutionally, the treaty followed the design of the Coal and
Steel Community, with an executive Commission, a parliamentary assembly with limited powers, a Council to represent national interests directly in the decision-making process, and a
Court of Justice. Whereas the Coal and Steel Community represented a revolution in Franco-German relations and international organization, the EEC was potentially more important because of its ability radically to reorder economic and political
relations among Member States.
III. TOWARDS THE SINGLE MARKET
Following the launch of the EEC, the history of European
integration is one of deepening and widening: the deepening of
16. See WENDY
1957: FROM STUDY

ASBEEK BRUSSE, TARF-s, TRADE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION,
GROUP TO COMMON MARKET

146-84 (1997).

1947-
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policy competence and the widening of membership. No
sooner was the EEC up and running than, in a remarkable reversal of policy, Britain applied to join.17 Hitherto Britain had
looked on as the original six Member States formed the Coal
and Steel Community and later the EEC, but steadfastly refused
to become a member. In Britain's view, European integration
was appropriate for countries vanquished during the war but not
for a victorious power with global interests, such as the United
Kingdom. Nor, in the immediate postwar years, was the nature
of British industry entirely compatible with Community membership.
The situation changed by the early 1960s when British exporters, subjected to a common EEC external tariff, pressured
the government to reverse course and apply for membership. It
would be ten years before Britain joined, thanks to French determination in the meantime to complete the customs union, implement a common commercial policy, and construct the common agricultural policy. The resignation of President Charles
de Gaulle, who personified French objections to British membership, paved the way for completion of Britain's accession negotiations. Britain finally joined in January 1973, alongside Ireland and Denmark, two countries economically tied to Britain
and eager to benefit from EEC membership.
Britain and Denmark, less inclined for historical reasons to
share sovereignty than the original Member States, had difficulty
settling into the EEC. For Britain in particular, the first decade
of membership was troublesome. No sooner was Britain in the
EEC than the new Labor government, which won the election
on a mildly anti-membership platform, demanded a renegotiation of Britain's accession terms and promised to put the results
to a referendum.1 8 Britain's EEC partners were dismayed, but
appreciated the domestic politics behind the government's position. The renegotiation ended in March 1975 when the newlyestablished European Council agreed to double the size of the
European Regional Development Fund, most of which would go
to Britain in lieu of large-scale agricultural subsidies, and ac17. See ALAN MILWARD, THE UK AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE RISE AND FALL
STRATEGY, 1945-1963, at 317-51 (2002) (discussing Britain's membership
application).
18. See DAVID BUTLER & UEW KITZINGER, THE 1975 REFERENDUM 13-20 (1976).
OF A NATIONAL
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cepted the principle of a "correcting mechanism" to refund
some of Britain's payments to the EEC budget. Although a resounding majority voted in favor of staying in the EEC in the
ensuing referendum, the question of Britain's membership
terms flared again less than five years later when Margaret
Thatcher, who became prime minister in 1979, demanded and
eventually won for Britain a huge, annual budget rebate.1 9
The EEC's second round of enlargement had an entirely
different dynamic. Greece, Portugal, and Spain emerged from
dictatorial regimes in the mid-1970s and promptly applied for
membership. Joining the EEC would demonstrate their international rehabilitation, help consolidate their fledgling democracies, and offer badly-needed economic assistance. At a time of
rampant Euro-sclerosis, it was comforting for the Community to
be courted by three potential new members. It was also an opportunity for the EEC to cast itself in a political light as a grouping of democratic countries committed to the protection and
promotion of fundamental rights. Following relatively short negotiations, Greece entered the EEC in January 1981. Portugal
and Spain, which presented more formidable economic challenges, went through a longer and more arduous accession process, joining only in January 1986.2 o
Deepening the EEC essentially meant completing the policy
objectives contained in the original Rome Treaty. The customs
union came into being in July 1968, eighteen months ahead of
schedule. With the customs union in place, the EEC adopted a
common commercial policy and conducted trade negotiations
on its Member States' behalf. The Common Agricultural Policy
("CAP"), a cherished French objective for which de Gaulle
fought tenaciously, was completed by 1970, when the Member
States reached an agreement on financing the CAP through the
EEC's "own resources"-monies, such as tariffs and duties, that
accrued to the organization itself rather than to national exchequers. In addition, the EEC concluded a preferential trade and
aid agreement with a large group of developing countries scattered throughout Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP")all former colonies of the Member States-first in the Yaound6
19. See ERIcJ. EvANs, THATCHER AND THATCHERiSM 79-89 (1997).
20. See CHRISTOPHER PRESTON, ENLARGEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN
UNION 46-86 (1997).

THE EUROPEAN
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Conventions of 1964 and 1969, then the Lom6 Convention of
1975.21
In one key respect, however, the EEC was lagging behind.
The projected single market was still far from finished. Completing the single market required a huge amount of legislation
at the European level in order to harmonize the Member States'
often disparate regulations.2 2 Harmonization, in turn, required
willingness on the part of Member States to vote, and occasionally to be outvoted, in the Council of Ministers. Although the
Rome Treaty provided for the introduction, by January 1966, of
qualified-majority voting in a range of EEC policies, de Gaulle
had blocked the transition to the new decision-making system
both in defense of specific French interests and because of a
principled objection to supranationalism, of which voting was a
potent instrument. De Gaulle's obstructionism precipitated the
"empty chair crisis," when French politicians and officials refused to participate in the Council and its committee sub-structure, thereby bringing EEC business almost to a halt. The crisis
ended with the Luxembourg Compromise, whereby in principle
the Council could make decisions by qualified-majority vote, but
in practice a country could prevent a vote being taken by claiming that a "very important national interest" was at stake.2 3
As national interests are notoriously difficult to define, and
"very important" is an imprecise criterion, in effect the Luxembourg Compromise gave obstinate Member States a means of
perpetuating unanimity in Council decision making, a practice
that became widespread in the recessionary 1970s. The combined effects of international financial turmoil, beginning in the
late 1960s, and the oil crisis of the early 1970s, caused massive
disruption to the EEC. Economically, the golden age of high
and persistent post-war growth came to an abrupt end. Rising
unemployment, spiraling inflation, and plummeting growth
swept Western Europe, although some countries fared better
21. For details regarding the European Community's early development, see HANS
VON DER GROEBEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIY.

THE FORMArW YEARS (1985).

22. See

MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE 61-82 (2001) (discussing harmonization and market integra-

tion).
23. See generally VIsioNs, VOTES AND VETOES: THE EMPrY CHAIR CRISIS AND THE LuxEMBOURG COMPROMISE FORTYYEARS ON (Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace & Pascaline

Winand eds., 2006) (discussing the empty chair crisis and its outcome).
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than others. At the same time, non-tariff barriers to trade between Member States, ranging from different national product
standards to dissimilar testing requirements, remained in place
and even proliferated. As the recession intensified, governments
became less and less willing to make concessions in the Council
on the removal of non-tariff barriers. Instead, they hid behind
the provisions of the Luxembourg Compromise, claiming that
important national interests were at stake (those interests often
being pressure from domestic lobbies). Not surprisingly, progress toward completing the single market came to a halt.
The revival of European integration and launch of the single market program ten years later therefore represents a remarkable turn-around in the EEC's fortunes. It was precisely the
Member States' mixed economic fortunes in the intervening
decade, coupled with intensifying international competition
from the United States, Japan, and the Asian tigers, that convinced national leaders to re-commit themselves to the original
core objective of the Rome Treaty-implementation of the single market. European manufacturers, besieged by cheaper,
more reliable American and Asian imports, especially in the automobile and electronics sectors, now called for an integrated
European market in which they could maximize economies of
scale, regain market share, and learn to compete globally.
National leaders were highly susceptible to such calls. The
bracing winds of neo-liberalism were blowing over the continent,
where left-of-center social democratic and right-of-center Christian democratic leaders grasped the need for fundamental
change. Presidents and prime ministers as varied as Margaret
Thatcher in Britain, Frangois Mitterrand in France, Helmut
Kohl in Germany, and Felipe Gonzdlez in Spain understood the
need to abandon old nostrums and failed approaches. Reflecting these changes, the communiques of several summit meetings
in the early 1980s included promises to complete the single market. Newly appointed Commission President Jacques Delors
grabbed the chance to revive the Commission's and the EEC's
fortunes by producing a White Paper, or policy document, on
achieving market integration.2 4
24. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
(June 1985).
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National leaders endorsed the White Paper at a summit in
June 1985, and also supported a recommendation by a special
committee, convened after an earlier summit, to hold an intergovernmental conference to revise the Rome Treaty. This was
the genesis of the Single European Act ("SEA"), which formalized the launch of the single market program and included important institutional and policy reforms.25 Signed by foreign
ministers in February 1986, the SEA committed Member States
to completing the single market by the end of December 1992.
In order for that to happen, national governments agreed to use
qualified majority voting for most of the harmonization measures listed in the Commission's White Paper.
One of the most important of the SEA's institutional provisions was the cooperation procedure for legislative decision-making, whereby the European Parliament won the right to a second
reading of Commission proposals. Although relatively modest,
the cooperation procedure set a precedent for the more farreaching codecision procedure, introduced in the Maastricht
Treaty and strengthened in subsequent treaty reforms. The rationale for the cooperation procedure was not simply to
strengthen supranationalism in the EEC, about which some governments were highly equivocal, but to close what was already
identified as the "democratic deficit"-the growing gap between
the governed and the governing in the EEC-by boosting the
decision-making role of the directly elected parliament.
The main policy innovation in the SEA was a commitment
to increase spending on economic and social cohesion (efforts
to bring poorer countries and regions closer to the communitywide economic norm). It was one thing to proclaim the importance of cohesion policy, but quite another to come up with adequate funding for it. A row soon erupted over the Commission's
proposal for EEC expenditure covering the period 1988-1992 to
include generous allocations for the structural funds, the means
by which cohesion policy would be implemented. Eventual
agreement on the new financial perspective, thanks to Ger25. See Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11); ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE
POWER FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT 314-78 (1998) (discussing the origin and negotiation of the Single European Act).
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many's generosity, paved the way for implementation of the single market program.
With two new Member States (Portugal and Spain), a generous cohesion policy, and a renewed drive for market integration,
the EEC appeared in the late 1980s to have a new lease on life.
Indeed, the momentum of the single market program helped
propel the parallel drive for monetary union, first contemplated
in the early 1970s and re-launched, over Britain's objections, in
the wake of the SEA. In June 1988, the European Council
agreed to establish a committee, under Delors's chairmanship,
to chart the road to monetary union. At the same time, the European Council approved the full liberalization of capital movements, a key element of the single market program and a necessary precondition for monetary union. These developments, together with cotemporaneous changes brewing in Central and
Eastern Europe, led inexorably to the Maastricht Treaty, one of
the most
important events in the history of European integra6
tion. 26

IV. THE UNSETTLED EUROPEAN UNION
The Maastricht Treaty subsumed the EEC into the European Union. 27 Together with existing and new socio-economic
policies, such as monetary union, which fell within its supranational "pillar," the EU included two additional pillars subject to
intergovernmental cooperation. One covered foreign, security,
and (later) defense cooperation; the other covered cooperation
on justice and home affairs to facilitate the fight against transnational crime and terrorism. The treaty's provisions for monetary union were the most far-reaching and eye-catching. 2 They
called for a common monetary policy, with a single central bank
and a single currency, by 1999 at the latest for Member States
capable of meeting the convergence criteria. Economic circumstances in the 1990s did not seem propitious for the launch of
monetary union, and public opinion was equivocal. Nevertheless a majority of the then fifteen Member States (Austria, Fin26. See generally COLETrE MAZZUCELLI, FRANCE AND GERMANY AT MAASTRICHT:
POLITICS AND NEGOTIATIONS TO CREATE THE EUROPEAN UNION (1999).
27. See generally Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, OJ. C 191 (1992).
28. See KENNETH DYSON & KEVIN FEATHERSTONE, THE ROAD TO MAASTRICHT:
TIATING ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 1-11 (1999)
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land, and Sweden had joined the EU in January 1995) met the
criteria and launched the final stage of monetary union at the
appointed time.
Monetary union was an ambitious undertaking that suggested a great degree of economic integration within the EU.
The utility of monetary union was nonetheless debatable.
Whereas the single market undoubtedly brought added value to
the collective European economy, although not as much as projected in Commission-sponsored studies conducted in the late
1980s, the benefits of a common currency were less certain.
Travelers in the euro-zone soon enjoyed the convenience and
savings of not having to change money into separate national
currencies, and businesses saved the costs of cross-border currency conversion. Nevertheless the single currency has not
brought about the large-scale benefits and precipitated the wideranging economic reform predicted by its early advocates. The
high value of the euro vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar is certainly gratifying to advocates of deeper European integration, but is costly for
euro-zone exporters and has facilitated the burgeoning trade
deficit with China whose currency, in effect, is tied to the dollar.
The impressive achievement of monetary union is mitigated
also by the restricted membership of the euro-zone. Britain
opted out during the Maastricht negotiations from the Treaty's
monetary union provisions. Denmark secured an opt-out during
the Maastricht Treaty ratification crisis. Sweden simply decided
not to abide by the monetary union provisions, although it met
the criteria for adopting the euro. Only three of the twelve
countries that joined the EU since 2004 (most of them in Central and Eastern Europe) have adopted the euro, bringing eurozone membership to fifteen of the EU's current twenty-seven
Member States. All of the EU's new Member States not yet in
the euro-zone aspire to join it, but will take some time to meet
the convergence criteria. Even when they do, membership of
the euro-zone will always fall short of membership of the EU, as
Britain is unlikely ever to give up the pound. As a result, differentiation in policy participation among EU Member States is
now a permanent feature of European integration.
Differentiation is evident in other policy areas, notably in
the free movement of people. The Schengen area, in which people may cross borders without a documentation check, covers
twenty-eight countries-but not all twenty-seven EU Member
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States. Britain did not sign the Schengen agreement and Ireland, which preferred to maintain its free travel zone with Britain, chose also not to join.2 9 Iceland, Norway and Switzerland
are the three non-EU countries within the Schengen area. The
non-participation of two EU Member States and the participation of three EU non-members in Schengen-an EU initiativedemonstrates the extent of differentiated integration in Europe
today.
The prevalence and likely increase in differentiated integration is a consequence of the EU's continuous enlargement. As
more and more countriesjoin, the range of national preferences
in the EU increases accordingly. Not all Member States are able
or willing to participate in every policy area. While wanting to
avoid a pick-and-choose approach, and wanting to safeguard the
integrity of core policy areas, such as the single market, the EU
has had to manage the diversity inherent in an expanding membership. A report on the future of European integration written
in 1976, three years after British accession and well before the
end of the Cold War made possible the accession of the Central
and Eastern European countries, called for institutionalized differentiation within the then EEC.3 ° With Britain opposed as
ever to further integration and a massive increase in membership looming after the end of the Cold War, the EU finally included provisions to facilitate differentiated integration in the
Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and
certain related acts (Treaty of Amsterdam)," later improved
upon in the Lisbon Treaty.
The extent of differentiation within the EU goes beyond
Member States' participation or non-participation in particular
policies to cover wide variations in levels of economic development and, in particular, economic performance among Member
States. The accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain accentuated a north-south development gap in the then EEC, which is
29. See Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, O.J. C 340/1
(1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (incorporating the Schengen acquis into the
framework of the European Union).
30. See generally Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the
European Council, E.C. BULL. SUPP. 1/76 (1975).
31. See generally Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 29, O.J. C 340/1 (1997).
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still significant despite nearly two decades of large-scale expenditure on development assistance and a marked improvement in
economic indicators in the three Mediterranean countries. The
accession of ten relatively poor Central and Eastern European
countries has opened an East-West economic gulf that cannot be
closed in the foreseeable future without massive amounts of
structural funding and years of double-digit economic growth in
the new Member States.
Apart from widely varying levels of national economic development due to historical factors such as the legacy of central
planning in Central and Eastern Europe, economic performance is highly differentiated throughout the EU. Even within
the euro-zone, some national economies are performing much
better than others. Poor economic performance has been especially striking in the big euro-zone economies, notably France,
Germany, and Italy, where labor market and other reforms are
lagging. The EU may include a monetary union but it conspicuously lacks a true economic union, with fiscal policy still being a
national responsibility. Fiscal coordination within the euro-zone
and coordination of employment policies and labor-market policy across the EU, under the umbrella of the Lisbon strategy for
economic reform, are relatively lax.
With relentless enlargement and a growing policy scope, the
EU is arguably more of a disunion than a union. It is also unloved by its citizens. The years of the permissive consensus,
when Europeans passively acquiesced in European integration,
ended in the late 1980s with the move beyond the single market
toward monetary union. The single market program was the
high point of public eagerness for integration, as Europeans enthused about the prospect of an imminent frontier-free area. As
the then EEC and soon-to-be EU intruded more into everyday
life, however, people questioned the accountability, transparency, and representativeness of European institutions. Concern about the democratic deficit and the diminution of self-government burst into the open in Denmark in June 1992, when a
narrow majority rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a national referendum. Although special concessions to Denmark made possible a second, successful, referendum and saved the Maastricht
Treaty, Denmark's original vote was a harbinger of similar rejections of treaty changes down the road, culminating in the results
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of the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional
Treaty in 2005.
It was not only the conduct of EU governance but also the
nature of the EU itself that seemed to bother many Europeans.
In a succession of treaty changes beginning with Maastricht, national governments increasingly emphasized the EU's political
character. In terms of policy scope and institutional design, the
EU resembled more and more a traditional nation state rather
than an international organization. In at least one fundamental
respect, however, the EU was decidedly unlike a nation state.
Most Europeans did not identify with the EU as they did with
their own nations. Few saw it as a political entity to which they
owed allegiance or fidelity, as they did to their countries of origin.
The disconnection between weak popular allegiance to the
EU and the organization's rising political profile came to a head
when national leaders signed the Constitutional Treaty in October 2004.32 There were many reasons why French and Dutch
voters rejected the new document, but a widespread aversion to
the politically charged word "Constitutional" in its title was undoubtedly one of them. Yet the existing treaties were already, in
effect, constitutional. Certainly, that is how the Court of Justice
interpreted them. But the tide of the proposed new treaty, as
well as some of its content, was unpalatable for many Europeans.
A redrafted version bearing a more prosaic and politically inoffensive title-the Reform Treaty, now known as the Lisbon
Treaty-is essentially the Constitutional Treaty under another
name. No longer a red rag to European public opinion, the
renamed and revised Lisbon Treaty will likely be ratified and
come into effect in 2009.
V. GENERAL ASSESSMENT
Levels of economic growth and living standards have been
at an all-time high in Europe since the end of the Second World
War. As Barry Eichengreen observes in a new economic history
of postwar Europe, it is difficult to assess the extent to which
European integration has contributed to the marked improvement in peoples' everyday lives since the mid-twentieth cen32. Constitutional Treaty, supra note 2, OJ. C 310/1 (2004).
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tury.11 Undoubtedly completion of the customs union and,
later, implementation of the single market program stimulated
cross-border trade and investment and contributed to economic
growth. The creation of the single currency reduced cross-border transaction costs for individuals and businesses alike and further stimulated trade and investment.
As national leaders acknowledged in 2000 when they
launched the Lisbon strategy for economic modernization, however, Europe still has a long way to go. European competitiveness and productivity lagged behind those of the United States
in the 1990s, while rapid economic development in China and
India has caused downward pressure on jobs, wages, and the sustainability of costly welfare systems. The decision of European
leaders to eschew, in the Lisbon strategy, the Community
method of legislative decision-making in favor of a less formal
process of cooperation-the open method of coordinationsuggests an awareness on their part of the limits of traditional
integration in the new economic circumstances of the early
twenty-first century. Negative integration-breaking down tariff
and regulatory barriers-was indispensable in the latter part of
the twentieth century, as Europe adjusted to the embedded liberalism of the post-war system, but may not be enough to help
Europe accommodate to the competitive pressures of the current stage of globalization.
The EU today needs to facilitate flexibility, entrepreneurship and adaptability on the part of economic actors facing new
global challenges. At the same time, the EU provides an essential means for its Member States to make a concerted response
to the challenge of climate change and the need for energy security. Yet faced with a troubling array of new issues, national
leaders are susceptible to protectionist pressures at the domestic
and EU levels. In addition, public skepticism about European
integration makes it more difficult for politicians to adopt imaginative initiatives to address pressing economic problems. Accordingly, the EU's potential for promoting economic security
and prosperity is likely to be underutilized.
Looking at Europe in historical perspective, it is more diffi33. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY SINCE 1945: COORDINATED
CAPITALISM AND BEYOND 1-14 (2007) (discussing the multiple factors that contributed to
the economic growth in Europe during the post war period).
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cult to evaluate the relative peacefulness than the relative prosperity of the post-war period. By the awful standards of the first
half of the twentieth century, and compared to earlier periods of
large-scale conflict, Europe was infinitely better off after 1945.
Between 1815 and 1914, however, Europe did not experience
extensive warfare, which suggests that the situation after World
War II was not unprecedented. But the contemporary period is
qualitatively different in at least one important respect: the demilitarization of European society. As James J. Sheehan points
out, before 1945 "[t]he mass reserve army made military service
a part of the life experience of millions of European men and
gave military institutions a central place in European society. " "
Precisely because of the horrors of World War II, militarism lost
its appeal in Europe and armies lost their dominant political and
societal positions. Disastrous wars of decolonization reinforced a
widespread public skepticism, if not outright antipathy, toward
the use of military force.
While experiencing the absence of war, Europe did not necessarily enjoy the blessings of peace for much of the contemporary period. Between the late 1940s and late 1980s, the Cold
War divided Europe down the middle. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ("NATO"), not the European Union, ensured Western Europe's military security in the face of Soviet
hostility, although European integration contributed to the cohesiveness of the alliance by helping to settle West Germany into
the post-war international order. Unlike the Coal and Steel
Community, the EEC owed its existence primarily to economic
opportunity rather than political or strategic necessity. Yet without the Cold War, the EEC might never have seen the light of
day. Absent the Soviet threat and, therefore, the strategic advantage of deeper European integration, the United States would
likely have blocked the establishment of a regional common
market that was inimical to its immediate economic interests.
Forty years on, the wars of secession in the former Yugoslavia were a striking reminder that peace was not pervasive in Europe even after the end of the Cold War. As Yugoslavia disintegrated in the early 1990s, a resurgence of old-fashioned nationalism ignited the kind of conflict reminiscent of Europe as a
34. See JAMES J.

SHEEHAN, WHERE HAVE ALL THE SOLDIERS GONE?: THE TRANSFOR-

MATION OF MODERN EUROPE

13 (2008).
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whole before 1945. The extreme nationalism at the root of the
latest Balkan wars showed how far the rest of the continent had
come since the end of World War II, and how far political rapprochement and reconciliation had yet to go in the farthest
reaches of the Continent. The Yugoslav debacle also showed the
limits of EU peacekeeping without a robust military capacity,
notwithstanding most Europeans' aversion to the use of military
force.
Going beyond a narrow definition of peace as simply the
absence of war, the EU has contributed greatly to European stability by helping to consolidate democracy in post-authoritarian,
transition regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe. The existence of non-democratic regimes in neighboring countries
helped shape the political identity, norms and values of the EU.
The impossibility of enjoying the economic benefits of EU membership without being democratic and respecting fundamental
rights strengthened progressive forces in Greece, Portugal, and
Spain, as those countries emerged from dictatorial rule in the
mid-1970s, and subsequently in Eastern Europe following the
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the Yugoslav wars and the unresolved Kosovo conflict
suggest that the prospect of EU membership, however longterm, is not enough to moderate the behavior of highly nationalistic, recalcitrant states.
VI. INTEGRATIVE OPPORTUNITIES AND
INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE
It is hard to imagine Europe without the EU. Counter-factual questions about how Europe might have developed had
such institutionalized integration never taken place are intellectually interesting but largely unproductive. Looking instead at
the record of European integration, it is more useful to ask what
drove it forward and whether the momentum has permanently
flagged. Clearly, economic, political and strategic circumstances
were decisive in bringing about the European Communities and
later the EU. The rapidity of postwar reconstruction and the onset of the Cold War gave an opening for the supranational initiative that resulted in the Coal and Steel Community. The obvious
benefits of greater international trade and the slow pace of
global liberalization led to the launch of the EEC. Member
States' mixed economic records in the recessionary 19 7 0s and
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intense pressure from global competitors provided the incentive
for the single market program of the late 1980s. The fall of the
Berlin Wall, imminent German unification, and the liberalization of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were vital
contributory factors to the deepening of European integration
in the Maastricht Treaty.
In each of these cases, national leaders-the most powerful
actors on the political stage-seized the opportunity to push European integration along. They sought above all to promote
their own countries' interests, but from a positive-sum rather
than a negative-sum perspective. It is easy to dismiss the idealism
of the founding fathers of European integration.3 5 Men such as
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer, and Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi
were understandably eager to promote their national interests in
a difficult postwar environment, but were inspired also by a
quest for European unity made all the more powerful by having
witnessed two world wars during their own lifetimes. The Coal
and Steel Community was an ideal opportunity to meet both national goals and European ideals. Jean Monnet, the architect of
Franco-German rapprochement, strove to achieve French economic modernization, for which he was responsible at the time
as a senior government official, and to set France, Germany and
neighboring countries on the road to a united Europe.
Charles de Gaulle, often portrayed as a villain in the story of
European integration, recognized that the newly-launched EEC
was economically advantageous for France and could also provide a foundation for the intergovernmental political union that
he envisioned for Europe. De Gaulle's rejection of supranationalism led to the empty chair crisis of 1965-1966, the most dangerous political moment in the history of European integration.
The terms of the agreement that ended the crisis thwarted EEC
decision-making and weakened the Commission for years to
come, but signaled de Gaulle's willingness to preserve the Community in the interests of France and of Europe as a whole.
Moreover, the Franco-German Elysee Treaty of Friendship 1963,
concluded by de Gaulle and Adenauer to cement Franco-German rapprochement, became the main vehicle for Franco-Ger35. See, e.g., ALAN S. MILWARD, EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION STATE 318-44
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man leadership of European integration in the years ahead.3 6
Margaret Thatcher, like de Gaulle an ardent inter-governmentalist, is also portrayed negatively in the history of European
integration. Yet Thatcher's demands for budgetary reform
helped the EEC put its finances in order in the early 1980s, and
her advocacy of deregulation and economies of scale provided a
powerful impetus for the single market program later in the decade. Thatcher parted company from other EEC leaders on the
issues of cohesion policy and monetary union, which she
deemed economically unsound and (in the case of monetary
union) politically undesirable. Nevertheless her contribution to
European integration was much more constructive than conventional opinion suggests.
Jacques Delors, who became Commission President in January 1985, is often credited with triggering the dramatic improvement in the EEC's fortunes epitomized by the single market program. Delors envisioned a stronger, deeper EEC, with responsibility for many more policy areas and greater supranational
powers. As a charismatic, skilled politician from a large and influential country (France), with close ties to the leader of the
largest and most influential Member State (Germany), Delors
was ideally placed to embody the acceleration of European integration. Yet Delors was an enabler rather than an architect of
the EEC's revival, which was already underway by the time he
arrived in Brussels. As Commission president, Delors was capable of pointing the way forward and generating momentum for
deeper integration but lacked the authority for ultimate decision
making, which lay in the hands of national leaders.3"
Perhaps the most influential of those leaders in the 1980s
and 1990s, and the one most inclined towards deeper integration, was German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who formed a close
association with Francois Mitterrand and relentlessly pursued
monetary union. European idealism rooted in Christian democratic principles, together with a keen appreciation of German
national interests, motivated Kohl's behavior on the Brussels
stage. Although overshadowed in retirement by a political scan36. On the legacy of the Elysee Treaty, see generally

HAjIG SIMONIAN, THE PRrIV-

19691984, at 9-48 (1985).
37. For an insider's account ofJacques Delors's leadership of the Commission, see
LEGED PARTNERSHIP:

FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

GEORGE Ross, JACQUES DELORS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

(1995).
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dal, Kohl deserves recognition for his determined leadership of
the EU and commitment to the single currency.
Today's national leaders seem less enamored of European
integration, perhaps reflecting widespread public disillusionment with the EU. French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have not forged a close relationship, and Franco-German leadership may no longer be enough,
by itself, to drive European integration forward. Britain, as ever,
remains semi-detached. Even a leader as enthusiastic about Europe as Tony Blair was unable to bring Britain into monetary
union, the most emblematic EU policy area. Other national politicians, constrained by their countries' circumstances or their
own inclinations, are unwilling or unable to provide decisive European leadership. Nor is the Commission, politically weak and
institutionally subservient to the national governments, capable
of filling the void.
CONCLUSION
As it stands, the EU is institutionally awkward, highly differentiated, and broadly unpopular. The process of European integration seems to be in one of its periodic troughs. Nevertheless
the EU's fortunes may soon improve as national governments
appreciate the organization's potential to help its Member States
meet formidable economic and strategic challenges. Regardless
of what lies ahead, European integration is a remarkable process
that has greatly benefited Europe and the wider world. In historical context, it is much too soon to say whether European integration is an enduring innovation in relations between peoples
and states, or is a transitory development whose usefulness
peaked in the post-war period and which can never develop further because of enduring national identities and attachments.
Even if the latter turns out to be true, nothing can detract from
the achievements of European integration in the second part of
the twentieth century, a century whose early decades were
marred by two world wars and a deeply divisive inter-war period.
By that significant standard, European integration has already
been an immense success.

